Wednesday, January 20, 2010

THE INDIAN WINTER

THE INDIAN WINTER

losing warmth in Indo-Russian relations

(This post is a reproduction of an article by the author, published in a national magazine in 2009.Though foreign policy doesn’t remain static and some changes happened since then, people interested in some pertinent issues which cancer Indian foreign policy and make its vision myopic and mortal, may find it useful.)

Siberia is famed for its chill, but Indo-Russian relations have been characterized by the warmth of Leningrad. The fabled bilateral bonhomie took a turn in December 2007, when Indian naval chief admiral Suresh Mehta burst out before the press, excoriating the Russian establishment for the cost overrun and time overrun associated with the overhauling and refurbishment of the aircraft-carrier Admiral Gorshkov, thereby bringing out deep differences to the public. Unprecedented in the history of indian diplomacy,a defence chief dared to chart out the policy contours for the future,giving suggestion that India should go for better partners in defence deals.Russia was dignified in its response, but the event marked a turn in the phase of Indo-Russian relations since 2000,a period characterised by new synergy and strategic partnership. Viewed in the context of increasing Indo-U.S engagement ,the events tell more than what it meet the eyes. The policy of Indian government since the signing of nuclear agreement with the U.S in 2005 is perceived as a reflection of crass realism which is gaining hold over Indian diplomatic establishment ,with the potential to set a long lasting winter over Indo-Russian relations.

The history of Indo-Russian relations, it is said, is the story of India’s foreign policy. The landmark in the bilateral amity was the Treaty of Peace Friendship and co operation,signed in 1971, in the context of the war for the liberation of Bangladesh. The kernel of the arrangement was the mutual consultation clause for taking further action in the context of any external threat. Dramatic to the core was the timing of the treaty,which was struck at a time when the U.S.A, annoyed by the prospect of an Indian victory in Bangladesh war,ordered U.S.S Enterprise to reach Bay of Bengal.The intent to intimidate was not only thwarted,but the bond of friendship was scripted in golden letters,a friend in need is a friend in deed.

Afterwards, the relation between India and the U.S.S.R never looked back, in spite of some Indian resentment at the Russian intervention in Afghanistan.The U.S.S.R even rose to the level of replacing the U.S.A to become India’s largest trading partner.but all these were not to last long.The dissolution of the soviet union left India friendless and the successor of the red empire,Russia,was not in a position to maintain the strong relation.both India and the Russia looked back to the west due to circumstantial compulsions.but the chill was not to last long.By the late 90s the honeymoon of Russia-west friendship began to wear off. Further,Russia was to know the power of leadership, after a long and hopeless array of leaders from Andropov to Gorbachev and Boris Yeltzin. The emergent leadership under Vladimir Putin found truth in the old Russian adage, an old friend is better than two new friends. The rapprochement was inevitable and Putin visited India in 2000, and it marked a new era in Indo-Russian friendship by striking a strategic partnership.

The strong leadership under Putin harked back to the heydays of Indo-soviet relation and both the countries regained their old fondness within no time. They found shared meaning in newly emerged challenges like global terrorism and Russia strongly supported India’s entry into United Nations Security Council.The bilateral meetings were institutionalised through the introduction of annual summits, which,in a way reflected their zest for continuous engagement.

In international politics, it is said, there are no permanent friends or enemies but only permanent interests.True to the realist dictum, Indian foreign policy establishment found a natural ally in the united states, after the signing of the nuclear agreement with it. Enchanted by the Empire, India began to bath in the prospect of becoming its south Asian vassal. Russia became a second priority, and, to the surprise of Russia, it voted against Iran at IAEA.

True is it that,the U.S offered us nuclear collaboration.but it was Russia which offered India nuclear reactors at kundankulam,and it even showed willingness to come out of N.S.G so as to facilitate India’s nuclear power plan.All these moves were unconditional, while the natural ally sought to make the deal contingent up on India’s pro U.S stand on many issues, including Iran.Not to say,a few months prior to the signing of indo-U.S nuclear deal,it was Russia who supplied Uranium to Tarapur atomic plant,when its operations were about to be halted due to the shortage of fuel.

Opportunism is the mother of all politics and international politics is no exception.india began to cold shoulder any enthusiastic initiative by Russia due to the fear of antagonising the U.S. For instance, at the behest of Russia and China,India was accorded observer status in Shanghai Co-operation Organisation, which has metamorphosed into a security organisation in recent times. But India was circumspect and subtly conveyed its commercial motive by sending petroleum minister Murli Deora to the crucial summit held in 2005.The message was loud and clear, India want the co-operation of SCO for its rising energy needs and nothing else.And it was natural that India couldn’t participate fully in the negotiations, as India’s petroleum minister was no equal to the heads of other states.

Similar was the manner in which India gave its luke warm response to the proposal of the Arc of peace and stability by Russia. Fearing to annoy the U.S, India expressed its willingness to co-operate only in the economic aspect of this grouping.but surprisingly, India did not hesitate in participating the Malabar Exercise with United States held last year ,which was expanded to include Japan,Singapore and Australia,all invariably the U.S.allies.Annoyed at the military exercise at its backyard,China send a demarche to India,and India was not bothered.

Similar was India’s response to the idea of Quadrilateral forum of Asia Pacific Democracies,originally proposed by Taro ASo, the previous Japanese foreign minister.Envisioned to include India,Japan,Australia and United states,India was not hesitant.The plan was consigned to backburner by Japan itself when the new foreign minister Masahiko Koumara took over.

Russian discontent

From all these cited instances,what becomes evident is India’s blatant double standard in pursuing uneven policy towards two friends ,one old and other new;one reliable and unconditional while the other unreliable and conditional.

Moreover,the bedrock of Indo-Russian relations is the defence relations,where India was accorded more than the status of a customer.Russia,in the past gave state of the art equipments to india along with critical technologies.Sadly the U.S is getting hold over the major military aviation contracts,an exclusive Russian preserve so far.For instance,theU.S company Lockheed Martin captured the order for six all weather,all terrain C-130 J military transport planes. All military transport planes in Indian armed forces inventory were of Russian origin.

Likewise,another was a deal of $2.2 billion for maritime surveillance planesfrom the U.S company Boeing led consortium.All our long range surveillance planes were from Russia and the Boeing P-8i maritime reconnaissance planes would be breaching that suzerainty. What makes such deals disadvantageous are the terms associated with such purchases,known as conditionalities. While Russian machines were given to us without any strings attached, American ones come with the necessity to take their consent prior to the deployment of such weapon systems, thereby compromising the very basics of war logistics. Moreover, the supply of spares would be dictated not by commercial criteria, but would be subservient to American national interest.To top it all,there would be few technological transfers,which were the hallmark of Indo-Russian defence deals.Technological transfers,indeed,signified Russia’s abiding interest in india’s strategic independence.

Apart from the loss of major contracts,Russia is also hurt by indias decision to contract Israel for the supply of spares for the Russian made Mig-21. Also the planned maketing attempts of the world’s first supersonic cruise missile,Brahmos jointly made by the two countries have not gone down well with our northern brothers.

Such turn of events is making Russia introspect its policy prerogatives vis-à-vis India.A point at hand,is Russian response to the Mumbai attacks,which displayed the absence of activist concern,a Russian feature vis-à-vis India.When the U.S dominated the stage launching its shuttle diplomacy,Russia was sidelined and its response lacked the sheen.

A major concern for Russia is the proposed inter-operability of forces between India and the U.S.The American intention behind such a plan is to get access to sophisticated Russian flying machines,like Sukhoi, so as to neutralise Russian technology,and update its own defence preparedness.Russia is well aware of such possibilities and would be cautious in sharing futuristic technologies, particularly in the case of the combined development of fifth generation fighter plane, which is on the anvil.

Why India should rethink?

If the current Indian dispensation cannot think Indo-Russian relations in terms of old emotionality implicit in bilateral ties, the national interest dictates it to factor in,the transformation of Russia into a world power,on the basis of its recently found economic might.Russia became assertive in staking its global claim,in recent times, particularly after the Georgean and Ukrain crises.Russia was able to evacuate American military bases in Central Asia,working in tandem with other friends,under the ageis of Shanghai Co-operation Organisation.After successfully resolving its boundary disputes with China,Russia is getting ready for a phase of intense bargaining,with powerful friends on its side.

Russian hold over central Asia is there to stay,and worthwhile is to remember that it is Russia which helped India to realise its long cherished dream of setting its first foreign military base in Tajikistan.

Unless India realises the geo-political and geo-economic might of Russia,India wouldn’t be a shareholder in its future rise.As rouble strengthens vis-à-vis a weakening dollar,India cannot afford to neglect its northern neighbour anymore.

More pertinently,the course of action of sino-indian relations, nosedived to unforeseen depths after the signing of Indo-U.S nuclear Deal.The events at NSG and renewed Chinese claims over Indian territory of Arunachal Pradesh,is an indicator of the future,china can create more insecurity and nuisance value on India’s borders.It would be a pipe dream to address it by allying with the U.S.At best the U.S can prevent an open war between India and China,which otherwise also willnot happen.More disturbing is the boundary skirmishes and tacit hostility which Chinese are adept at displaying.India could address this challenge only by roping in Russia and forming strong bonds with its polar neighbour.Stronger Indo-Russian bonds will allay Chinese threat perception and is a sure road to safer future.

Indo-Russian relations so far did not enter a phase of open disenchantment.But unless acted soon,the opportunity would be missed.One most challenging task is to infuse life into the declining bilateral trade,which is abysmally low at $3.5billion per annum.Annual bilateral summits are institutionalised between them,but in the absence of strong day to day political engagement ,it may turn morbid.2008 was celebrated as THE YEAR OF RUSSIA IN INDIA,and we could not even bring any substantial change in our thinking.2009 is now being celebrated as THE YEAR OF INDIA IN RUSSIA.Now this is time to act,to bring a fundamental change in our diplomatic thinking.It would be in Indian interest to see that an Indian winter would not be thrust upon the warmth of Leningrad.

Abhilash M.R

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